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This paper revisits philosophical questions regarding the relationship between 
mathematics and matter. I briefly present four contrary and contemporary 
perspectives on the speculative force of mathematics, as a provocation for further 
discussion on the subject of sciento-metrics. I first consider the ideas of the 
philosopher Quentin Meillassoux, as a way of setting the stage for various kinds of 
materialist philosophies of mathematics. I then turn to the ideas of two 
mathematicians - Fernando Zalamea and Giuseppe Longo - and a computer scientist 
- Gregory Chaitin - and explore how their discussions of contemporary mathematical 
practice offer important insight (and twist) regarding the relationship between 
mathematics and matter. 
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In 1960 the scientist Eugene Wigner (1902-1995) wrote a controversial paper called 
“The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences” (Wigner, 
1960). Wigner’s paper was read as problematically positing a kind of magical or 
transcendent role for mathematics, in its capacity to describe and predict physical 
phenomena. Wigner suggested that the accuracy of mathematical formulations was 
an epistemological “miracle” indicating that the “laws of nature must already be 
formulated in the language of mathematics” (Wigner, 1960) 1. He claimed that 
mathematics involved the free creation and manipulation of concepts, and its 
“appropriateness” was a “wonderful gift” in a complex chaotic world with little 
regularity and invariance. Notably, as Jose Ferreirós (2018) points out, Wigner was an 
important figure in developing effective mathematical methods for quantum physics, 
which involved shifting from the classical calculus to new algebraic ‘group methods’. 
By the 1930s many physicists resented the displacement of the calculus, which 
cranked out actual solutions, for the more abstract structural approach of modern 
algebra and its meta-level patterns. They were concerned that the new goal of physics 
had become the search for compelling algebraic models and super symmetries and 
had lost touch with the bedrock of empirical reckoning. This “plague of groups” or 
“group pest” infestation, transformed the everyday practice of physics (Ferreirós, 
2018).  
Wigner’s perspective on “the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” seems to 
have also been inspired by the turn to axiomatics and formalist qualitative methods, 
led by David Hilbert (1862-1943), and perhaps by his involvement in the Manhattan 
Project, and the development of the Atomic bomb. This 20th century mixture of modern 
algebra, axiomatics, war efforts and quantum science forms the background for his 
1960 essay. 2 Wigner’s suggestion of a hidden mathematical language yet to be fully 
translated suggests that matter is encoded or scripted by symbolic form, and humans 
 
1 He attributes this perspective originally to Galileo. 
2 It was John Von Neumann (1903-1957) who spurred Wigner on to apply group theory to quantum mechanics and the two 
went on to participate in the Manhattan Project and the development of the Atomic bomb (Scholz, 2006). 
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are the interpreters who are more or less skilful at deciphering it.3 The Anthropologist 
Vicki Kirby (2011) is critical of approaches that either mystify mathematics as miracle 
or treat mathematics as pure language game detached from the real. She argues that 
each is characterized as anthropocentric: the first imagines that the earth is there to 
serve humans, whose magical mathematics aims to control it (reductive scientism, or 
mathematical deism); the second imagines that the earth is beyond reach and un-
encounterable, cloaked in a cultural veil of human mathematics (social 
constructivism). Kirby suggests instead an approach that dethrones the 
anthropocentrism of these two traditions, and seeks a new empiricism that remixes 
mathematics and matter:  
Measure would then not only be the anthropocentric habit inscribed in 
Protagoras’ aphorism ‘man is the measure of all things’ nor reflect a unique 
human capacity. Instead, measure would be a tendency or potentiality of 
matter. Geometry, for instance, would be a more material mingling of geo and 
metric. For Kirby, too much of socio-cultural theory forecloses this possibility 
by defining geometry against geology, language against matter, mathematics 
as a representation that codes matter from without. (de Freitas, 2016a, p. 656)  
Kirby (2011) provokes us to consider corporeality more generally as ‘calculating and 
thinking material through and through’ so much so that the very nature of corporeality 
is ‘to mathematize, represent, or intelligently take measure of itself’ (p. 63). She 
demands that we reckon with the way that matter and measurement are part of a 
metamorphic mixture, open to remixing, reformulating, and altered modes of bodying. 
This ensures that mathematics remains in the world (rather than transcends it) and 
emphasizes a pluralist new materialist mathematics. Accordingly, mathematics 
remains part of the metamorphic mixture of matter, and cannot detach itself from the 
world, to rise above, as inert, static, and apolitical.   
 
3 Philosophers of science have spent centuries discussing matter-mathematics mixtures, often using the term ‘realist’ to 
characterize the belief that the mathematics is ‘out there’ in some empirical sense, or that mathematics “inheres” in the 
physical world. These claims are usually contrasted with alternative appeals to formalism or idealism, both of which detach 
mathematics, in different ways, from the material world. There are epistemic and ontological dimensions to these positions, 
and variations have emerged over the decades (see Benacerraf & Putnam, 1964 and Tymoczko, 1998 for foundational work. 
For instance, Nancy Cartwright has argued for a pluralist realism, insofar as she contests the law-like nature of mathematics-
physics relationships, in favour of a “capacity” that inheres in the “dappled world”. 
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In this paper, I explore recent proposals for rethinking the ontological mixture of 
mathematics and matter. I discuss thinkers who engage closely with the specifics of 
mathematical practice, whilst keeping the ontological question about mathematics 
and matter front and center. I examine four contemporary perspectives on the nature 
of mathematics, as a provocation for further discussion on the topic of sciento-
metrics, which is the title of the section launched with this issue of the journal. I first 
consider the ideas of the philosopher Quentin Meillassoux, as a way of setting the 
stage for various kinds of materialist philosophies of mathematics. I then turn to the 
ideas of two mathematicians - Fernando Zalamea and Giuseppe Longo - and a 
computer scientist - Gregory Chaitin - and explore how their discussions of 
contemporary mathematical practice offer important insight (and twist) regarding the 
relationship between mathematics and matter.  
My aim is to highlight the distinctive insights of each of these four thinkers, regarding 
the material practice and speculative reach of contemporary mathematics. All four 
attend in different ways to the onto-epistemic foundations of mathematics, focusing 
on either the speculative power of mathematics or the corporeal-material dimension 
of mathematical activity. For Meillassoux, mathematics is essential in framing his 
“speculative materialism” and pursuit of the absolute necessity of contingency, while 
Chaitin presents himself as a modern Pythagorean, and reads contemporary 
mathematics through computing machines. Zalamea follows a Peircian pragmatist 
approach, tracking conceptual transits across the field, and Longo defends the interval 
and the continuous as fundamental modes of mathematical materiality. There are 
affinities between these approaches, in that each draws on contemporary 
mathematics for insight into socio-material problems, but they also differ significantly 
in where they place the human. I am interested in how we might tap their insights and 
cobble together a new materialist philosophy of mathematics so that questions about 
human mathematical ability might be considered in the context of a broader post-
humanist opening onto the mathematiz-ability of the world. In other words, I seek ways 
of studying human mathematical habits, often conceptualized in sociological, 
philosophical, and psychological theories, as part of an earthly, worldly, and even 
cosmic mathematical ontology. The distribution of mathematical ability across 
complex ecologies opens up the debate about mathematical ontology in new ways, 
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links to current concerns about algorithmic contingency, and urgently demands fresh 
insight from the post-humanities. I briefly survey these four approaches here, so that 




Although Wigner (1960) saw the empirical success of mathematics as following “the 
empirical law of epistemology”, he also avows formalist foundations for the free play 
of mathematical ideas. Hilbert’s formalist program was felt far and wide, but 
especially in modern algebra, where the speculative and generative force of 
mathematical invention was strongly evident. One can see in the new coupling of 
physics and algebra in the 1930s, the emergence of new conceptual mixtures that are 
in some strong sense entirely unimaginable from within past mathematics. In this way, 
we might use the term ‘speculative mathematics’ as a stand-in for hypothetical or 
inventive mathematical ideas, the kind of activity that brings forth a new mathematical 
object and then builds a somewhat altered and robust mathematical theory around it. 
But if the ‘speculative’ is to mean more than hypothetical and creative within a given 
discourse, and instead designates something with more of an ontological bite, then 
we need to consider its implications.  
The metaphysical ‘speculative’ is typically used to reference pre-Kantian philosophies 
that allowed themselves the freedom to speak about that which was beyond the reach 
of human knowledge. Pythagorean declarations that “all is number” come to mind – 
this is a speculative declaration which sounds an awful lot like dogmatic metaphysics, 
and precisely the kind of mysticism which Kant’s project critiques. And yet the 
“ontological turn” we have witnessed across the post-humanities suggests that there 
are new metaphysical urges all around us, as well as keen interest to map the power 
of the speculative. If, as some claim, we are now breaking with the long legacy of Kant 
and his insistence on the filtering faculties of human judgment, which disallow any 
‘real’ encounters with the world, or in the least updating this notion of a filtering faculty 
in more-than-human terms, it seems rather important that we take up and discuss 
proposals for the speculative reach of mathematics.  
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In Après la finitude (2006/2008), Meillassoux argues that post-Kantian correlationism 
(between thought and being) undermined the speculative import of mathematics. He 
points to the “Galilean revolution” in scientific method in which mathematics became 
central to Western science when the world was newly understood and accessed 
through its mathematizable qualities. Many historians point to this revolution as the 
founding of contemporary science. The aim for Meillassoux, however, is to show how 
the Galilean revolution, which decenters the human within the solar system, entails a 
mathematizing of the world that bore within it the “possibility of uncovering knowledge 
of a world more indifferent than ever to human existence, and hence indifferent to 
whatever knowledge humanity might have of it” (Meillassoux, 2008, p.116). It is 
precisely this mathematization of nature, or rather the possibility of this 
mathematization, that gives purchase to scientific statements of fact about the world 
prior to or after humankind, according to Meillassoux. In other words, there is a certain 
facticity to the world that is larger than human knowledge, but that subsumes human 
knowledge precisely because of its speculative tendency. Mathematical science 
effects a radical decentering – “the decentering of thought relative to the world within 
the process of knowledge” (Meillassoux, 2008, p.115). It is this “within the process of 
knowledge” that substantiates facticity that is not merely correlational or conditional 
on the human faculties. 
If Kant’s critical project was meant to expose the naivety of previously dogmatic 
speculative philosophies, in which empirical fact and metaphysics commingled 
without adequate policing of the conditions of knowledge, he also shut down the 
speculative force of science itself. Meillassoux sees the Kantian critical project as a 
kind of therapy, a solace meant to comfort humans and alleviate their anxiety in the 
face of the radical decentering of human thought achieved through the speculative 
character of scientific knowledge.4 Thus the speculative is precisely what achieves a 
“non-correlational mode of knowing” in empirical inquiry, a kind of knowing that is 
more than human insofar as it refuses the Kantian conditions of knowledge 
(Meillassoux, 2008, p.119). The tragedy for philosophy, accordingly, was to abort the 
Galilean scientific revolution and follow Kant, wrongly denying the speculative import 
 
4 He states that his work answers the question: “How is a mathematical science of nature possible?” - a science that avoids the 
metaphysical and the correlationalist? (p. 128). 
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of scientific knowledge in encountering the real, denying the robust capacity of the 
world to be multiply-mathematized (mathematiz-ability). Philosophy erred towards 
Kantian transcendental idealism, when it should have invested in the speculative 
nature of mathematics and science, pursuing what Meillassoux calls a “speculative 
materialism”.  
This kind of materialism is often aligned with philosophical realisms, like that of 
Graham Harman.5 For Meillassoux, who prefers to not use the term realism, 
mathematical statements are the best way to plug into the absolute necessary 
contingency of the world, and it is this emphasis on “necessary contingency” that can 
make them speculative in their scope. The concept of contingency is key for rethinking 
the way in which mathematics and matter are mixed. Note that Meillassoux is focused 
on absolute contingency rather than mere historical contingency, and he dismisses 
probabilisms and aleatory reason, for totalizing the possible. He turns away from 
probability and towards set theory, stating: “the most powerful  conception of the 
incalculable and unpredictable event is provided by a thinking that continues to be 
mathematical – rather than one that is artistic, poetic, or religious. It is by way of 
mathematics that we will finally succeed in thinking that which, through its power and 
beauty, vanquishes quantities and sounds the end of play.” (p. 108).  In other words, 
he propounds that contingency comes in two modes, the first is finite/historical 
(captured by probability) and the second is the Cantorian ‘transfinite’: the first is an 
empirical contingency that refers to the precariousness of any given mathematization. 
The second is an absolute contingency that asserts a non-being that may never be 
realized, but is elaborated in particular mathematizations.  
Meillassoux (2008) is not arguing for the absolute truth of mathematics, but for “the 
absolute scope of mathematics” (p. 125-126). And this is meant to grant mathematics 
a certain autonomy in its grasping tendencies – in other words, it can go beyond any 
human constructed correlation between world and model. This philosophy is not 
 
5 Barad’s commitment to a relational ontology might seem to put her squarely in the target zone for Meillassoux’s critique of 
the correlationists, but since she breaks with ‘social constructivism’ and human exceptionalism, and she explores the acausal 
world of quantum field theory, I think there are ways to consider these as kindred projects in certain aspects. See also Dolphijn 
& Van der tuin (2012) and de Freitas (2017). The role of mathematics in various agential realisms, such as Karen Barad or 
Bruno Latour, is not as well developed as it is in Meillassoux, although Barad (2007, 2017) seeks to show how the world may be 
investigating itself mathematically, how creatures “do mathematics” not as algorithmic rule-followers, but as more-than-human 
“thought experiments”(Barad, 2017, np) 
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about a mathematics that determines or encodes the world, but rather the claim is that 
the world possesses an inherent capacity to be mathematized. It’s crucial to state 
loudly that the term “mathematizability” does not and cannot designate a pre-given 
particular mathematics waiting to be actualized. In some sense, mathematics actually 
safeguards the necessity of contingency. He makes this explicit when stating: 
“Whatever is mathematizable can be posited hypothetically as an ontologically 
perishable fact existing independently of us. In other words, modern science uncovers 
the speculative but hypothetical import of every mathematical reformulation of our 
world.” (Meillassoux, 2008, p. 117). Notably, mathematics partakes of the linked 
ontological tendencies of the hypothetical, the necessary, and the speculative. 
Meillassoux convincingly argues that post-Kantian critical philosophy, despite the 
good work of this project in fighting the ideological dogmatism that underpins 
metaphysics, has become a kind of “skeptical fanaticism”. In contrast, he shows how 
speculation is not a regretful or negative act of straying from the real, but rather 
accentuates and affirms thought’s capacity to become radically alien. This approach 
links with but diverges from the ideas of Badiou (2006) who emphasizes the capacity 
of mathematics to make thought alien or non-human. I think the project of Meillassoux 
is helpful in its attempt to defamiliarize mathematics, and to consider its potential as 
a radical worlding process unto itself. Below I discuss his focus on the Cantorian 
transfinite, and I revisit the contribution of Galileo, to explore corporeal questions 
about matter-mathematics mixtures.   
 
Foundational tendencies 
Galileo’s revolutionary contribution was that he coupled mathematics with motion in 
ways that furnished a scientific dynasty and a frenzy of mathematizing (Johnson, 
2008). This is philosophically important for a number of reasons, most significantly 
because the revolution (a collective achievement) broke with the Aristotelian and 
Euclidean dictum that separated the mathematical concept (as concept) from time 
and motion (Châtelet, 2000). The mathematics of motion – accurate or otherwise – 
plays a highly significant role in any historical account of the relationship between 
mathematics and matter. Galileo’s seminal inclined plane experiment, for instance, 
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centered mathematics in the study of motion, and was considered by many historians 
to be emblematic of the emerging mathematical paradigm of European experimental 
science (Gribbin, 2002). The experiment, as recounted in 1638, sets a bronze ball 
rolling down a carved groove along the length of a 20 foot-long piece of wood. Chalk 
marks were made at equal distances along the piece of wood, and a water-clock was 
used to measure the time when the ball passed each of the chalk marks. Each time 
the ball passed a chalk mark, the amount of water was removed and weighed; the 
measurement of time was equated to the measure of the weight of the water.  
Many have debated whether and how Galileo actually produced this empirical result. 
In the 1950s the historian of science Alexandre Koyré argued that there were so many 
sources of error that it was dubious that Galileo had actually performed the 
experiment (Koyre, 1977)6. How could he have measured time intervals that were a 
fraction of a second? But in the 1970s, historian Stillman Drake examined unpublished 
Galilean documents and found some that clearly indicated an experiment had indeed 
been performed. In response to Koyré’s criticism, and based on archival evidence, 
Drake (1975, 1978) surmised that the measurement of time was achieved using music 
and not a water-clock. He argued that musicians and conductors divide time into equal 
portions with great precision for long periods of time without thinking of seconds or 
any other standard unit. He pointed out that a conductor “maintains a certain even 
beat according to an internal rhythm, and he can divide that beat in half again and 
again with an accuracy rivaling that of any mechanical instrument” (Drake, 1975). 
Using a simple tune that had two beats per second, Drake himself demonstrated how 
you could mark the location of the descending ball at the second beat of the rhythm 
and refine the marks after a few trials. Measurement of the various distances travelled 
during these two-beat counts revealed the effect of gravity on free-falling bodies.  
This story is telling for a number of reasons. Drake shows how the actual empirical 
act of investigation involved space as a function of time (equal beats of time are used 
to show differences in distance). Thus he shows how time is the engine of the 
experiment, the independent variable. But more pertinent to the argument of this 
paper, is the fact that the most compelling explanation for how Galileo actually 
 
6 Notably, Wigner (1960) references this research.  
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completed this seminal experiment involves the human body and its tacit engagement 
with duration and rhythm. We see the strange marriage of number and time that 
infuses the act of experimentation and measurement. Of course the act of measuring 
is implicated in the findings, but what Drake shows us about this experiment is not 
simply that facts are produced through human intervention; he points to the force of 
time as that which animates matter, and he shows how Galileo plugs into the rhythms 
of corporeal duration – in all their multiplicity and modulation – in order to perform his 
experiment. This perspective resonates with other historical accounts of 
developments in physics and mathematics, such as those discussed by Gilles 
Châtelet, which has informed my work on sympathetic coordination in mathematical 
behaviour (de Freitas et al, 2019). Châtelet (2000) looks historically for the emergence 
of new mathematical diagrammatic gestures over the centuries, tracking the “physico-
mathematics” of human invention. With reference to Galileo, he writes: 
At first sight this physico-mathematics does appear to be an axiomatic giving 
precise form to the system of equivalence between mathematical concepts 
and physical concepts. To understand the revolutionary coup that installs this 
axiomatics is to discover the proximity of two horizons made up of virtual 
determinations which exceed the current set of explicit determinations and 
which still remain available for examination. Conceived as an apprenticeship, 
as a Promethean impulse, and not as a combinatorial manipulation of beings-
in-the-world, or as an ‘abstract game’, mathematics necessarily fulfils itself in 
physics. It is in these terms that we should understand Galileo’s audacity in 
daring to bring the boundary forms of pure geometry into contact with the 
world of moving bodies (Châtelet, 2000, p. 4). 
And yet for Meillassoux, perhaps following his early mentor Badiou, the interest in a 
mathematics-matter mixture lies in the set-theoretic foundations of mathematics. In 
other words, he doesn’t dwell in the material practice of a physico-mathematics, but 
instead turns to set theory and its role as a foundation (“condition”) for the speculative 
reach of mathematics and the speculative power of knowledge. He seeks the 
speculative force of mathematics in the capacity of set theory to render the infinite, 
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rather than in the processual nature of materiality. He will summarize the speculative 
import of mathematics in the following two claims:  
1. “Every mathematical statement – precisely insofar as it is mathematical – is not 
necessarily true, but absolutely possible.” (Meillassoux, 2008, p. 126, italics added,). 
That is to say, mathematical statements are not necessarily true, since such a claim 
would be a form of speculative idealism, and would pander to a kind of reductive logic, 
while Meillassoux is interested in a speculative materialism. And so he claims that 
mathematical statements are instead absolutely possible, because they operate as 
hypothetical systems structured through necessity, in a world of absolute 
contingency.  
2. For Meillassoux, some mathematizations are better than others insofar as they 
substantiate the nontotalizability of worlds. There is one particular mathematical 
theorem that both exemplifies and assures the speculative import of mathematics. 
This theorem comes from Georg Cantor’s (1845-1918) attempts to refine the methods 
of mathematics using set theory. This a theorem “that allows us to maintain the non-
totalizability of the transfinite” (Meillassoux, 2008, p. 127). For Meillassoux, this 
theorem must be considered both absolute and unconditionally necessary. As such it 
then ensures that we do more than embrace the contingency of the world, but instead 
grasp the necessity of contingency. Mathematics in this instance is an activity that 
affirms the necessity of contingency. Cantorian mathematics helps us resolve Hume’s 
problem of empiricism, with an ontology that emerges through the principle of 
unreason or factiality. It is the mathematics of Cantor’s set theory, and his 
“detotalization of the possible” (p. 110), that answers Hume’s problem. The “super-
immensity of the chaotic virtual” cannot be measured by any number, finite or infinite 
(p. 111); The laws of nature are stable for no reason.  
I want to suggest that this way of conceiving the speculative import of mathematics 
both helps and hinders our efforts to think about mathematiz-ability. On the one hand, 
I understand Meillassoux’s project as an attempt to affirm the (limited) truth value of 
human science, while denying the privilege or right to claim that such knowledge is a 
mark of human achievement. We cannot claim correlationist truth nor metaphysical 
truth. Cantorian mathematical knowledge emerges in the material world and is not 
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only a human constructed knowledge, capable of thinking the speculative outside of 
thought. Humans are simply lucky (or unlucky) to comprehend the material world – 
stability of natural laws is not necessary, but is the case. Scientific practice can 
achieve this feat, if it avoids the probabilisms of aleatory reason, because it is an 
inherently mathematizing kind of activity that can dethrone the human subject and 
detotalize number. That being said, it follows that there might be worlds where science 
does not flourish, worlds found perhaps in certain examples of “extro-science fiction”, 
but these seem rather impossible to conceptualize (Meillassoux, 2015). 
The ‘materialism’ of this speculative materialism might seem rather thin to those 
thinkers focused on the materiality of mathematical practice. For instance, one might 
look more carefully at mathematical practices for how they engage a sort of free 
intensive force in the ‘batter itself’ that can morph into various forms of measure. This 
perspective brings us back into the mess of material practices and minor 
mathematical gestures, back to the kind of close reading that Gilles Châtelet 
performed, when seeking examples of inventive physico-mathematics. Despite the 
importance of foundations, I think the absolute scope of mathematics should be 
evident in diverse mathematical practices, rather than only evident in the famous 
Cantorian method for marshalling the transfinite. I suspect that the mathematics of 
non-totalizable worlds probably also lives in more mundane and minor mathematics, 
not as a ‘correlational’ concession to humans, but as an expression of an indifferent 
world which we encounter contingently. We cannot just bracket chance, for absolute 
contingency. We occupy a chance-inflected embodied event coordinated in such a 
manner so as to partake of mathematical worlds. This is a fortunate commingling that 
allows particular bodies, perhaps more than others, to indulge in or enjoy scientific 
knowledge as it evolves. In the next section, I turn to two mathematicians – Zalamea 
and Longo - who critique what they surmise is a continued fascination with 
philosophical ‘foundations’ in work like that of Badiou and Meillassoux, when 
contemporary mathematical practice reveals more about worldly mathematiz-ability.  
 
Metamorphic mixtures of matter-meaning 
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Fernando Zalamea offers an aesthetic image of contemporary mathematics that I 
think seems fairly well-suited to an agential, lively and speculative materialism. 
Although Zalamea’s book A synthetic philosophy of mathematics (2009) is very much 
a book about great (mostly white male) mathematicians, the overarching claim is that 
these people have succeeded in plugging into a metamorphic mathematical 
potentiality that joins their activity into a collective effort. Collaboration across 
mathematical communities occurs through “the exceptional protean capacity” of 
mathematics itself. The book proposes a “transitory ontology” for mathematics, and 
pursues a “continuity” between the phenomenal, the ontic, and the epistemic. This is 
a mathematics, according to Zalamea (2009), that is attentive to shifting and temporal 
unfolding, to gluing the global with the local, to tracking the “asymptotic webs of truth” 
across diverse conceptual developments (p. 142). 
According to Zalamea (2009), collaboration across mathematical domains reflects 
the unity of mathematics, but also entails the emergence of new objects that 
constantly tear the field open. He offers a series of case studies, and claims: 
The unity of mathematics expresses itself, not only in virtue of a common 
base upon which the All is reconstituted (set theory), but – before all else – 
in the convergence of its methods and in the transfusing of ideas from one 
to another of its various webs. The penetration of algebraic methods into 
analysis, itself subordinated to topology, the ubiquitous geometrization of 
logic and the structural harmony of complex analysis with arithmetic, are all 
examples in which mathematics’ global unity can be perceived in its local 
details. (Zalamea, 2009, p. 36-37) 
Zalamea describes the field of mathematics in terms of fluid mixture – in 
discussing a whole raft of examples of mathematical developments, he uses words 
like “decantering”, “pouring”, “transfusing” “filtering”, “saturating” and “distilling”. 
Hence his attention to the ways in which the ideas transit from domain to domain, 
and metamorphize as they do. He argues that the radical transformation of 
mathematics in the 20th century, due in large part to the mathematician 
Grothendiek’s hugely influential algebraic methods, which emerged from group 
methods, intellectually corresponds to changes in physics, with the development of 
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relativity theory. Any philosophy of mathematics worth its salt, he argues, must 
examine advanced mathematics and he reviews a set of philosophers and 
mathematicians who do that – such as Lautman, Badiou, Maddy, Cavaillès, 
Châtelet, Wilder, de Lorenzo, Polya, Lakatos, Maclane, Rota, Patras, Corfield, 
Tymoczko, Kitcher, and Kline.  
Zalamea’s project is very much a process philosophy of mathematics, intent on 
refusing a static or absolute idealism whereby mathematical concepts transcend 
and detach from the spatio-temporal world. In the case of Grothendieck, he finds 
what he calls a “practice of a relative mathematics” (p.140). This approach breaks 
with a static “absolute” mathematics (“in the style of Russell”) and develops an 
image of mathematics in transition, so that the very concept of invariant becomes 
unanchored and relativized, as he engages with a register of universals that are said 
to be capable of unmooring themselves from any ‘primordial’ absolute. He supports 
these claims with reference to the particular technical practices employed: “In a 
technical manner, both Einstein and Grothendieck manipulate the frame of the 
observer and the partial dynamics of the agent in knowledge.” (Zalamea, 2009, 
p.141).  
He describes Grothendieck’s method as involving a:  
web of incessant transfers, transcriptions, translations of concepts and 
objects between apparent distant regions of mathematics, and secondly, an 
equally incessant search for invariants, proto-concepts and proto-objects 
behind the web of movements (Zalamea, 2009, p. 141).  
Insofar as this is the creative force of Grothendieck, it is also for Zalamea a method 
of plugging into a “reticent structure” or “proto-geometry” that is in the batter itself, 
so to speak, articulated through the method that Grothendieck called “sounding 
out” (p. Zalamea, p.152). Grothendieck will state that “One of my passions has been 
to name the things that discover themselves to me, as a means of apprehending 
them … this is not at all to fashion or build structures … It is rather to express, as 
faithfully as we can, these things that we are in the midst of discovering and 
sounding out …” (Grothendieck in Zalamea, p. 152-154).  
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Thus the transit of mathematical knowledge is not simply an exchange but also 
onto-generative “sounding out” – a transit of knowledge is a creative act when a 
new mathematical object or technique comes into being, stirring up the matter-
meaning mixture. This speaks to the speculative force of mathematics, but brings 
the ontology away from the absolute. According to Zalamea, this process of 
remixing is not well captured in elementary mathematics, but only in more 
advanced mathematics – and hence his critique of the analytic tradition and 
philosophies of mathematics that focus only on the meaning of statements like 
7+5=12 or on the classical foundational ‘crises’ of Cantor and Gödel. It’s the rich 
contemporary concepts of topoi and categories that he turns to: “Topoi, which are 
something like parallel universes for the development of mathematics, are 
categorical environments sufficiently vast for the development of an entire 
sophisticated technology of the relative to be possible.” (Zalamea, 2009, p. 141).  
Zalamea also draws extensively on what he calls the “dynamic Platonism” of the 
philosopher Albert Lautman, an inspiration for Deleuze as well. Lautman showed 
how mathematics often develops through breaking up its own rigidity by remixing 
key pairings like continuous/discrete or symmetry/dissymmetry. New 
mathematical structures emerge through transits and collaborations that partake 
in that remixing.  
The richness of mathematics is largely due to that elastic duplicity that 
permits, both technically and theoretically, its natural transit between the 
ideal and the real. (Zalamea, 2009, p.54) 
Contrary notions (local/global, form/matter, container/contained, etc) dwell 
within groups, number fields, Riemann surfaces and many other 
constructions … the contraries are not opposed to one another, but, rather, 
are capable of composing with one another so as to constitute those 
mixtures we call mathematics. (Zalamea, 2009, p. 58)     
In discussing the mathematician Alain Conne’s “Quiddital mathematics” – as well as 
mathematicians Michael Atiyah, Peter Lax, and Maxim Kontsevich – Zalamea 
suggests that some of this work points to a kind of “intensified, infinitely refined 
Pythagoreanism” (p.226). For Zalamea, this means that such work might support new 
Elizabeth de Freitas 
 
 




insights into physico-mathematical objects, mapping new mixtures of number and 
matter. He argues that these new mathematical developments show how arithmetic 
and physics are woven together in ways that are not predetermined in advance; how 
the ubiquity of noncommutative processes in “actual nature” point to a “conceptual 
nature” (p.223). Notably, Zalamea is committed to a kind of progress whereby new 
maths can in fact enhance or improve our ability to mathematize. Zalamea suggests 
that the specific mathematical practices that have emerged in the last decades are an 
amplification of human “technical, imaginative and rational capacities” (p.375). In his 
words “the invasion of cohomologies, groups, and metrics” has been decisive in 
advancing this kind of metamorphic mathematics, and in enhancing our ability to 
model the material world (p. 373). In the next section I turn to the ways in which this 
“fluid” nature of mathematics engages with the digital and the discrete, in the work of 
Gregory Chaitin and Giuseppe Longo.  
 
Computation and continuity 
Mathematics seems to become enlarged, again and again, in Zalamea’s interlacing 
process of transits, across the physical sciences, and across mathematical 
domains. Gregory Chaitin, widely known for his work in mathematics and computer 
science, describes himself as a contemporary Pythagorean, and suggests that a 
post-Gödel “open” and “creative” mathematics is at work in the world (Chaitin, 2012, 
p. 12-13). For Chaitin mathematics also undergoes a historical evolution, so that 
current styles emerging out of developments in the twentieth century, force us to 
realize that computers must be considered, in his terms, “a revolutionary new kind 
of mathematics.” (Chaitin, 2012, p.33).  
Notably, Chaitin is often an inspiration to current theorists of the computational 
universe, everyone from Stephen Wolfram (2002) to Patricia Clough (2016) and 
Luciana Parisi (2016), for he proclaims that the software universe runs on a math that 
“cannot provide certainty because it is not closed, mechanical, it is creative, plastic, 
open!” (Chaitin, 2012, p.29). He contrasts the “old” math of “Newtonian differential 
equations” with what he calls the “postmodern discrete algorithmic math” of 
computing, a mathematics that has “infinite complexity” (Chaitin, 2012, p. 34).  
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Chaitin is a Pythagorean because he is not simply seeking to simulate living systems 
using mathematical ‘systems biology’, but rather wants to “find the simplest possible 
mathematical life-form” (Chaitin, 2012, p. 41). He states “Math itself evolves, math is 
completely organic” (Chaitin, 2012, p.88). This process of evolution, he asserts, is not 
simply a gradual continuation of mathematics, but entails radical invention, whereby 
mathematics becomes radically different: “each time it faces a significant new 
challenge, mathematics transforms itself” (Chaitin, 2012, p. 87). In other words, it 
mutates and may become unrecognizable to itself. This actualization of different 
kinds of mathematics is for Chaitin evidence of a small ‘m’ mathematics emergent in 
our environment, however he still subscribes to a capital “M” mathematics that he 
describes as “static, eternal, and perfect” (Chaitin, 2012, p.75). Based on this claim, 
and some other clues, one finds lurking in Chaitin’s writing, as in many speculative 
projects, a commitment and desire for a fixed and static absolute. Moreover, 
contemporary mathematics, in Chaitin’s perspective, is more aligned with 
computational paradigms of computer science, rather than modern algebra, which 
makes his ideas appealing to those theorizing the relationship between mathematics 
and information (where matter and information are confounded).  
The mathematician Giuseppe Longo (2015) critiques this image of a computational 
universe, and calls it a “flat” and “uni-dimensional” discrete-computational approach. 
Such an approach to the question of mathematiz-ability is built on Turing’s project to 
build a logical-formal computing machine, and is therefore tied to a kind of axiomatic, 
set-theoretic and logical image of mathematics. Longo (2015) claims that these 
methods have “profoundly impaired the comprehension of biological phenomena” 
(p.7). He sees a kind of impoverished logic encoded into the software analysis of 
complex ecosystemic structures, and goes on to bemoan the dominance of an 
“arithmetical discrete/finite, decidable (and thus programmable) world view” (p. 8). 
Zalamea (2009) similarly states that “nothing could therefore be further from an 
understanding of mathematical invention than a philosophical posture that tries to 
mimic the set-theoretical analytic, and presumes to indulge in ‘antiseptic’ procedures 
as the elimination of the inevitable contradictions of doing mathematics or the 
reduction of the continuous/discrete dialectic.” (p. 183-184).   
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The question as to how our own human habits of mathematizing are linked to 
mathematics as a worlding process shifts, with Longo, back to the eco-biological. 
Longo (2015) emphasizes the “utterly human” concept of symmetry (and the breaking 
of symmetry) in mathematics, art and language, pointing to the “fundamental bilateral 
symmetry” that characterizes our animal bodies (p.11). To this he adds the claim that 
mathematics partakes in an “active relation to the world” captured in the ongoing 
developments of different kinds of measurement: classical, relativistic, and quantum 
(see also de Freitas, 2016 and de Freitas & Sinclair, 2018, 2020). He suggests that non-
commutative geometries might help us better comprehend ontogenetic biological 
processes, as cascades of symmetry changes. He goes so far as to say that there is 
a correspondence between mathematics (as a study of quantities organized in 
structures) and the cosmos, but decries that “this shouldn’t be considered a new 
Pythagoreanism” (p.12). Mathematical ability, for Longo, entails a coordinated action 
with the world which resists us – the world says “no”, and “channels our epistemic 
praxis, which is of an eminently organizational character ...” (p.13).  
This “real friction with the world” enmeshes material processes with mathematics, a 
kind of geologic entailment that goes back to pre-human forms, whilst refusing any 
sort of immanent mathematical structure (p.16). Our brain and body are organized in 
such a way, whereby particular physiological structures and neural networks are both 
conditions for particular kinds of geometry, and simultaneously plastic, responsive 
and generative, allowing for new kinds of sensitivity to emerge. Longo (2015), for 
instance, considers a radically different alien mathematics produced if the usual kind 
of corporeal symmetry that we enjoy was absent (p. 18). Similarly, Ian Stewart (2017) 
argues that we consider the existence of a fully alien xenomathematics that is not 
simply equivalent to some version of our mathematics, modulo differences in notation 
and rule. In other words, xenomathematics would not be translatable into human 
mathematics. Stewart (2017) makes this claim compelling in two concrete scenarios: 
The first explores an alternative prime number system that would be essentially 
incomprehensible to us because it would involve such gigantic “computational cost” 
in terms of the amount of algorithmic and arithmetic work needed to translate it into 
our own mathematics. The second examines the fundamental aporia at the heart of 
any axiomatic system, adequate for arithmetic, focusing on problems that emerge, 
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due to the axiom of choice and its alternatives. All of this suggests, for Stewart, that 
earthly mathematics is simply human - all too human - in its limitations.    
Like Zalamea, Longo critiques the proposal that set theory is an ultimate foundation 
of mathematics, as this neglects the spatiality of situated mathematics. If the 
category of sets were the alleged ultimate universe of intelligibility, the mathematical 
concept of dimension would vanish into dust. For Longo, dimensionality “in the entire 
semantic richness of the word” is crucial for understanding worlds and worlding 
processes. Spatial dimension is implicated in any material process, he suggests, as 
though it were the condition of possibility. Notably, there is something deeply spatial 
in the theoretical ‘turn’ that mathematics has taken since Grothendieck (Zalamea, 
2009). In contrast, set theory destroys the concept of dimension through 
isomorphisms that map 𝑅𝑛 to R, and 𝑁𝑛 to N. “These isomorphisms are essential to 
the theories in question: in the first case they allow us to speak of cardinality, in the 
second they allow the definition of a Universal Machine, of Turing’s great ideas, which 
led to the production of compilers and operative systems of informatics.” (p. 23). 
These isomorphisms are indeed essential for certain kinds of mathematics, for certain 
kinds of mathematics, and yet this uni-dimensional perspective, collapsing all finite 
isomorphic powers into its flat episteme, seems to shun the spatio-temporal density 
of matter.  
Longo prefers an ontology that seeks the “natural” topology of “intervals”, where the 
interval is that which forbids the absurd isomorphisms mentioned above. Emphasis 
on the interval relates to Longo’s recent elaboration of the continuity/discrete debate 
(Longo, 2019), and recalls Deleuze’s (1985) pursuit of the interval as that which is 
occupied by affection and intensity – The interval is also related to the Bergsonian 
centre of indetermination (p. 60). Longo suggests that the concept of the interval is at 
the empirical heart of mathematics, and generative of so much speculative 
mathematical invention (see also de Freitas, 2018). He states: “Now, the minimal 
structure that one needs to assume in order to correlate mathematics and the world 
is a topological invariance, that of dimension.” (p.23). Thus it is the interval - classic 
instrument of measure, and dimension – that rescues the intelligibility of 
mathematics. This, suggests Longo, brings home the point that the discrete codifiable 
world of computation fails miserably to speak to the physical world of life processes. 
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In related argument, Zalamea (2012), using the work of Charles Peirce, argues that the 
best way to understand the mathematics of the interval is to reimagine the mingling 
of chance and continuity. In this way, chance is not simply mathematized as that 
which breaks with the continuous and enthrones the probably (the thrown dice), 
through the work of statistics and the discrete, but also that which stitches together 
the continuous interval with abductive speculation – drawing from a vast surreal 
space of hypotheses.  
This might be our best way to rethink the force of contingency somewhat differently 
to that of Meillassoux. Instead of a flat static mathematics of sets, Zalamea (2009, 
2012) and Longo (2015, 2019) direct our attention to the work of mathematical activity 
– principally, the speculative act of abduction. Through the speculative act of 
abduction, we smudge the discontinuity and patch together both the mathematical 
continuum but also the cosmological continuum of life itself. Abduction is then not 
only a human faculty, but is an expression of a worldly preoccupation with continuity 
and chance, or synechism and tychism, which were the terms that Peirce used to 
describe his metaphysics of continuity and chance. For Peirce, continuity and chance 
are the two entangled metaphysical attributes of the world. 
Conclusion 
I’ve focused here on a mathematical capacity (a mathematiz-ability) that might 
animate the world in ways that are more-than-human, suggesting that a materialist 
but speculative ontology helps us understand mathematical behaviour broadly 
conceived. This is not a totalizable capacity waiting to be revealed, not a transcendent 
“miracle” explaining the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics, for that would 
displace the essential contingency – or absolute contingency –of worlding 
mathematical processes. The capacity to mathematize does not belong to humans, 
although it is uniquely expressed in human habits of making models, simulations, 
measurements and other engagements with metamorphic mixtures. When looking 
across the contributions of Zalamea and Longo, we note a concerted effort to examine 
the ontological commitments entailed in contemporary mathematical practices, 
where they find robust creative gestures that bring forth new concepts and new 
transits. At this scale of practice, Longo draws our attention to the persistent power 
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of the interval, and the generative tension between the discrete and the continuous, 
so that we might see more clearly how mathematics is always engaged with 
nontotalizing methods, in many of its more mundane gestures, and not only when 
mastering transfinite numbers in Cantorian set theory. Although unable here to do 
justice to the complexity of each of these perspectives, I hope to have sketched some 
possible paths forward for new materialist ontologies, as they think with mathematics.  
This paper merely pokes at some of the more fascinating philosophical questions 
pertaining to mathematics, in the hope of engendering more deliberation about 
mathematical material practices, and with the aim of inviting more writing about the 
enigmatic relationship between mathematics and matter. To the extent that many 
people continue to believe, with some just cause, and following Wigner, that 
mathematics has some sort of uncanny effectiveness in describing our material world 
and predicting its future paths, we are left to ponder whether mathematical gestures 
are capable of actualizing a proto-mathematical realm of indeterminate potentiality or 
virtuality immanent to the empirical. Today there are proposals for a “post-empirical” 
physics which can determine its truth simply by attending to the internal coherence 
and aesthetic conditions of its mathematical models (see Kragh, 2015 for discussion). 
In Lost in Math: How beauty leads physics astray (2017), Sabine Hossenfelder reveals 
the extent to which contemporary physics has become obsessed with mathematical 
symmetries. These current debates regarding the enigmatic relationship between 
mathematics and matter underscore the ongoing relevance of Wigner’s topic. There 
is no denying that humans are utterly invested in mathematizing that which they 
encounter, as a material-cultural habit with all kinds of risky consequences, but there 
is also a speculative force to mathematics that engages in radical worlding 
experiments. For this reason, we need more transdisciplinary studies on this topic, 
drawing from anthropology, philosophy, history and biology, exploring the nature of 
mathematical practices, be they expert, novice, maverick, or non-human. 
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